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Since the seminal contribution of Mundell (1961), the literature on optimum
currency areas (OCAs) has proposed a variety of criteria for choosing if and
when countries should elect to form or participate in a currency union.1 These
criteria include similarity of inﬂation rates, the degree of factor mobility, the
openness and size of the economy, the scope of production diversiﬁcation, the
degree of price and wage ﬂexibility, the extent of integration in goods mar-
kets, the correlation between economic shocks across countries, the degree of
ﬁscal integration, and the political will to integrate. Bayoumi (1994) devel-
oped a formal OCA model that captures some of the key insights (expressed
informally in some previous papers) regarding the role of openness, diver-
siﬁcation, labor mobility, and the degree of correlation of economic shocks.
Aizenman and Flood (1993) provided a more detailed discussion of the role
of labor mobility as a criterion for an OCA.2
Much of the early literature on OCAs took optimality criteria as given.
Recent research, however, has emphasized that some of these criteria may
be endogenous, as a result of the very existence, and induced eﬀects, of a
currency union. For instance, it has been argued that similarity of inﬂation
rates may be promoted by participating in a currency union, and that a high
degree of convergence (or low dispersion) should not necessarily be viewed
as a pre-condition for forming one. Hoﬀman and Remsperger (2005) have
indeed found that, for the Euro area, the degree of persistence in inﬂation
diﬀerentials fell signiﬁcantly following the adoption of the common currency
1Ishiyama (1975) provides an early review of the literature. Subsequent discussions
include Masson and Taylor (1992), Tavlas (1993), Lafrance and St-Amant (1999), De
Grauwe (2000), and Mongelli (2002).
2See also Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) for a further discussion of
the role of labor market structure in the performance of monetary unions.
2in 1999. Fiscal discipline may also be a consequence of joining a union–as
suggested for instance by Fielding (2002) and as implied by the analysis in
Sun (2003)–whereas the degree of labor mobility and wage-price ﬂexibility
may respond endogenously to the elimination of currency ﬂuctuations.
Similarly, entry into a currency union may strengthen international trade
linkages over time. Whether increased trade integration raises the beneﬁts
of joining the arrangement depends on whether it leads to greater diversi-
ﬁcation of production or instead to increased specialization, which would
make countries more dissimilar. In theory, closer trade ties could result in
national business cycles becoming more idiosyncratic, if they result in coun-
tries becoming more specialized in goods in which they have a comparative
advantage. Countries would then become more sensitive to industry-speciﬁc
shocks. However, if common shocks (domestic or external) tend to predomi-
nate, or if intra-industry trade accounts for most of the trade, then business
cycles may indeed become more similar across countries experiencing greater
trade integration.3 This prediction appears to be supported by several re-
cent empirical studies on the endogenous eﬀects of currency unions on trade
ﬂows and business cycle synchronization. Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina,
Barro, and Tenreyro (2002), and Barro and Tenreyro (2007), for instance,
found that if trading costs are large, countries that trade more with each
other would beneﬁt more from adopting a common currency. In addition,
tighter international trade ties appear also aﬀect the nature of national busi-
ness cycles; countries with closer trade links appear to have more tightly
correlated business cycles. This is in part a reﬂection of the adoption of a
common monetary policy, but also the result of closer intra-union trade links.
3In addition, if business cycles become more synchronous as a result of greater trade
within the union, there may be less need for counter-cyclical movements in interest rates.
This, in turn, may improve the welfare gains from the union.
3Frankel and Rose (1998, 2002), Engel and Rose (2002), and Glick and Rose
(2002), all found that closer trade links lead to more trade and more closely
correlated business cycles across industrial countries.4
The present paper follows a very diﬀerent line of investigation than the
recent literature on OCAs. It focuses on how capital market imperfections
may aﬀect the welfare gains of joining a currency union. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, there has been very little analytical research on this issue; most of the
literature surveys referred to earlier do not even mention it as a relevant cri-
terion for assessing the net beneﬁts that countries might derive from forming
or participating in a union.5 This paper is an attempt to ﬁll this gap, using
a simple stochastic model where ﬁnancial intermediation services are pro-
vided only by banks. Our focus is on understanding how monitoring costs,
and the degree of competition in banking, aﬀect the welfare gains associated
with (and thus the desirability of participating in) a currency union. A key
step in doing so is a comparison between expected surpluses before and after
joining the union.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
a brief review of the current literature on capital market imperfections and
OCAs, and their potential importance for assessing the optimality of existing
(and future) currency unions. Section III presents the model and describes
4Some of these studies may overestimate the impact of currency unions on trade due
to sample selection bias and nonlinearities (Persson (2001)), as well as the endogeneity of
the decision to join a union, which is inﬂuenced by geography and distance. The latter
issue is addressed in Barro and Tenreyro (2007); they also ﬁnd, however, that currency
unions decrease comovements in output, possibly as a consequence of greater specialization.
Moreover, Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007) found that the impact of trade integration
on business cycle synchronization is much lower for developing countries than it is for
industrial countries.
5Exceptions are Giovannetti and Marimon (2000) and Alves (2008). However, neither of
these studies considers explicitly the existence and implications of credit market frictions,
as we do here.
4the functioning of the ﬁnancial sector prior to joining a union. The model
upon which our analysis is based extends the framework developed in Agénor
and Aizenman (1998, 1999, 2005), which itself dwells on the costly state ver-
iﬁcation approach pioneered by Townsend (1979). However, in an important
departure from these previous studies, in the present setting we also en-
dogenize the number of ﬁnancial intermediaries, under the assumption of
Cournot competition. Section IV considers the case where the country un-
der consideration joins a currency union, and analyzes the various channels
through which ﬁnancial factors may aﬀe c tt h ew e l f a r eg a i n s( c a l c u l a t e df r o m
the point of view of an individual member country) from joining the union.
These channels include changes in transactions costs, a diversiﬁcation-risk
premium eﬀect, and enhanced bank competition. Regarding the latter, we
draw an important analogy between the added monitoring costs that banks
may incur when operating outside their home country, and transportation
costs, in a manner similar to the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander
and Krugman (1983). A graphical illustration of this eﬀect is also provided.
Section VI summarizes the main results of the analysis and oﬀers some con-
cluding remarks.
2 Capital Market Imperfections and OCAs
As noted earlier, there has been limited research on the role of capital market
imperfections in the design and functioning of OCAs. In one of the few ana-
lytical studies available, Ching and Devereux (2003) examine the argument,
ﬁrst proposed by Mundell (1973), that a single currency area oﬀers risk-
sharing beneﬁts when domestic capital markets are limited in their ability
to provide consumption insurance. This argument goes against the “conven-
5tional” view, according to which a single currency area carries a welfare loss
owing to the fact that the use of the nominal exchange rate to respond to
country-speciﬁc shocks is precluded. They evaluate the costs and beneﬁts
of two monetary arrangements: a system of independent national currencies
and a single currency area. They ﬁnd that the presence of country-speciﬁc
shocks may either reduce or enhance the beneﬁts of a single currency area,
depending on the importance of exchange rate adjustment relative to risk-
sharing. Thus, in practice, either regime may dominate, although welfare
diﬀerences between the two regimes may not be large.
However, there are a number of additional issues associated with the
functioning of capital markets that have not been addressed. For instance,
to what extent is an improvement in the eﬃciency of domestic ﬁnancial in-
termediation necessary for a currency union to be welfare-improving? Are
these welfare gains monotonic? Or is it only beyond a certain threshold of
ﬁnancial development that countries get to beneﬁt from a currency union?
These issues are not mere analytical curiosities. Several observers have ar-
gued that the reason why the formation of the European Union (EU) in 1999
has not had yet a major (and lasting) impact on growth in member countries
is because much remains to be done to integrate highly imperfect national
ﬁnancial systems (Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Winckler (2002)).6 Al-
though ﬁnancial integration among Western European countries had started
well before the introduction of the euro, the single currency was expected
to accelerate the process, most notably by putting an end to exchange rate
uncertainty on trading decisions among member countries. This would have
6According to data recently published by the European Commission, real GDP per
capita grew at an average rate of 1.6 percent a year between 1999 and 2008, down from
an average of 1.9 percent during 1989 and 1998 and well below the 2.2 percent recorded
for Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which have remained outside the Union.
6also led to reduced risk premia, and thus borrowing costs. Furthermore,
conversion costs arising from the use of separate national currencies would
be eliminated. More integrated ﬁnancial markets would spur growth and
employment. Finally, the introduction of a single currency was expected to
i n c r e a s et h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e t i t i o nn o to n l yi np r o d u c tm a r k e t sb u ta l s oi n
the provision of ﬁnancial services.
Yet, as documented by Mongelli (2002), Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Man-
ganelli (2003), De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005), Baele et al. (2004), and
Schmiedel and Schönenberger (2005), although the degree of ﬁnancial inte-
gration in the Euro area has increased signiﬁcantly since the launch of the
common currency (particularly in the corporate bond and equity markets),
it remains far from perfect. Infrastructure of the securities market remains
highly fragmented, with a large number of providers for trading, clearing, and
settlement that are not eﬃciently connected to one another. In banking mar-
kets, and corporate lending markets in particular, price diﬀerentials remain
relatively high. A key reason for that is diﬀerences in practices (in credit
risk assessment, for instance), laws and regulations, and market fragmenta-
tion. Indeed, as noted in several of the studies mentioned above, particularly
Mongelli (2002, p. 21) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005, p. 22), ﬁnancial
structures continue to diﬀer signiﬁcantly among European countries, partic-
ularly with respect to contract enforcement costs. There is still considerable
persistence of “home bias” in lending to (and borrowing by) non-ﬁnancial
corporations.
The role of capital market imperfections in the viability and functioning of
a currency union is also an important consideration for developing countries,
many of which are currently considering either an enlargement of an existing
union, or the creation of new ones. In January 2008, for instance, members
7of the East African Community (consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, as
well as Burundi and Rwanda since July 2007) announced their intention to
bring forward, to 2012 from 2015, the formation of a monetary union.7 In a
review of the performance of the Common Monetary Area between Lesotho,
Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa, created in 1986, Wang et al. (2007)
note that an important issue (and source of concern) is the large disparities
among the ﬁnancial systems of the countries involved, and their low degree
of eﬃciency. Banks in countries other than South Africa are saddled with
large portfolios of non-performing loans and suﬀer from high operating costs.
Although there has been convergence in prime lending rates, interest rate
spreads remain large. Indeed, the World Bank (2004) found that lending
rate spreads between Lesotho and South Africa can be explained largely by
the higher default risks and weaker legal and judicial protection for lenders
in Lesotho. Moreover, they argue that the anticipation of a bailout of ailing
banks in one country by a future common central bank may keep union-wide
inﬂation expectations high and slow the speed of convergence in inﬂation
rates across members. Such expectations may also translate into higher in-
terest rates, with adverse eﬀects on ﬁscal deﬁcits, investment, and growth.
Alternatively, large diﬀerences in monitoring costs across countries may pre-
vent the ﬂow of capital within the union and constrain lenders’ capacity
to respond to greater borrowing needs (induced by improved prospects for
greater trade integration), and therefore limit the growth beneﬁts of the
union.
7For some recent studies focusing on the performance of existing currency unions in
developing countries, and the potential for creating new ones in Latin America, Africa,
and South Asia, see Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Masson and Pattillo (2005), Saxena
(2005), Sturm and Siegfried (2005), Edwards (2006), Neves, Stocco, and Da Silva, (2007),
Pattanaik (2007), Karras (2007), and Houssa (2008). None of these studies, however,
discusses in any detail the role of capital market imperfections in this context.
8What the foregoing discussion suggests is that there is some evidence sup-
porting the view that diﬀerences in ﬁnancial intermediation costs (including
both monitoring costs and contract enforcement costs) may explain the per-
sistence of large price diﬀerentials in banking across countries in a currency
union. In what follows we present a model that captures these factors and
examine their implication the beneﬁts–or lack thereof–of joining a currency
union.
3T h e P r e - U n i o n C a s e
We begin by considering the behavior of a small open economy prior to joining
a union. The country considered has access to an integrated world capital
market, but borrowing occurs (at a premium) in diﬀerent currencies. Risk-
neutral banks provide intermediation services to entrepreneurs, who rely only
on bank loans and demand credit to ﬁnance their investment projects. There
is a large number of entrepreneurs, m, each of whom is a price taker, and n
banks. We assume that m/n is large, implying that each bank can diversify
away its exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
The project’s future return is random. It depends on productivity shocks,
whose realized values are revealed to banks only at a cost. If an entrepreneur
chooses to default on his loan repayment obligations, the bank seizes any
collateral set as part of the loan contract, plus a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of the
project’s realized value. Seizing involves two types of costs: ﬁrst, verifying
the outcome of the project is costly; second, enforcing repayment requires
costly recourse to the legal system.
Investment Ii at the beginning of the period by a representative entre-
9preneur i results in output of a single good
Yi = a
p
Ii(1 + εm + δi), (1)
where εm is a macro shock, and δi an idiosyncratic i.i.d. shock, uniformly
distributed in the interval [−¯ δ,¯ δ],w h e r e¯ δ>0. The good produced is traded,
a n di t sp r i c ei st h e r e f o r eﬁx e do nw o r l dm a r k e t s .
To simplify, we will assume only two possible states, with equal probabil-
ity, for the macro shock:
εm =
½
¯ ε Pr = 0.5
−¯ ε Pr = 0.5 , (2)
where ¯ ε>0.
3.1 The Demand for Loans
Investment is bank ﬁnanced, at a contractual interest rate of rL. Default trig-
gers a penalty, equal to αYi. Hence, assuming zero collateral for simplicity,
the entrepreneur’s debt service, Si, will follow the rule
Si = min[(1 + rL)Ii;αYi]. (3)
The macro shock is public information. By contrast, the producer-speciﬁc
shock is revealed to the bank only at a cost, proportional to the level of
investment, cIi,w h e r ec ∈ (0,1). To simplify, we assume parameter values
that imply full repayment by all producers in the good state of the macro
shock (ε =¯ ε). In the bad macro state of nature, the threshold value of the
idiosyncratic shock leading to default, δ
∗
i, is determined by
(1 + rL)Ii = αa
p
Ii(1 − ¯ ε + δ
∗
i). (4)











2 < 0.( 5 )
10Banks are risk neutral. All entrepreneurs are ex ante identical from the
banks’ point of view. Banks therefore oﬀer an identical contractual inter-
est rate rL, associated with banks’ expected yield of rB,a n dﬁnance the
equilibrium investment level, denoted by I∗.
As discussed in Agénor and Aizenman (1998, 1999), and as derived in the
Appendix of Agénor, Aizenman, and Hoﬀmaister (2008), the link between
the contractual lending interest rate and the bank’s expected yield on the
contract is






















where rB is the bank’s expected yield on lending, determined later.
Given that entrepreneurs are risk neutral, applying (1), (3) and (5) yields
the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁt, ΠE,a s
ΠE = a
p
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which shows that, in equilibrium, the borrower in eﬀect “pays” the cost of
state veriﬁcation.
From (7), the ﬁrst-order condition determining optimal investment (which

















11Equivalently, this equation can be rewritten to show that optimal in-
vestment is determined by equating the marginal product of capital, a/2
√
I,
to the expected cost of borrowing funds, which is the sum of banks’ gross





I∗ =1+rB + ψc, (9)
where ψ is the sum of the probability of default, given by 0.5
R δ∗
i
−¯ δ dδ/2¯ δ,p l u s












Equations (5), (6) and (8) characterize the equilibrium triplet (I∗,r L,
δ
∗) corresponding to a given rB. It implies a downward-sloping demand for
credit, I∗, and an expected producer’s surplus, Π∗
















These results lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An increase in the expected rate of return on loans, or a
rise in monitoring costs, reduce both investment and the expected producer’s
surplus.
3.2 The Cost of Funds and the Risk Premium
The bank’s expected cost of funds, or the expected yield on depositors’ money
needed to attract savers, is denoted by r0. Assuming risk-averse depositors,
the cost of banks’ funds is given by
r0 =( 1+τ)rf + ρ, (12)
12where rf is the risk-free interest rate on world capital markets (assumed ex-
ogenous), τ>0 a measure of transactions costs, and ρ ≥ 0 the risk premium,
which compensates depositors for the fact that banks may default on their
repayment obligations. In general, one would expect ρ to be endogenous.
For instance, in the absence of deposit insurance, recessions could be associ-
ated with a lower net yield on deposits, implying a higher risk premium (see
Agénor and Aizenman (2006)). In what follows, we will assume ﬁrst that ρ
is exogenous, and will discuss later the impact of ﬁnancial integration and
diversiﬁcation on the risk premium.
3.3 Equilibrium Loan Supply
The n domestic banks in the economy diﬀer only in the cost of running
the bank (that is, the cost of operating the business). We assume that this
“administration” cost is ﬁxed and denote it by μj,f o rj =1 ,...n.B a n k sa r e
ordered according to their cost eﬃciency, μj+1 > μj.
With m entrepreneurs and n banks, the credit market equilibrium condi-
tion is given by
mI
∗(rB;c)=nLr, (13)
where Lr is the supply of loans oﬀered by the representative bank.
Banks compete in Cournot fashion. Let ¯ L−r denote the aggregate supply
of all the other n −1 banks, and let rB(¯ L−r, Lr) denote the market-clearing
interest rate determined by (13), for the case where bank r lends Lr,w h e r e a s
the remaining banks lend ¯ L−r.
Cournot competition implies that the representative bank determines its




Lr{1+rB(¯ L−r,L r)} − Lr(1 + r0) − μr
¤
, (14)
13taking ¯ L−r as exogenously given. The quantity rB(¯ L−r,L r) is the expected
bank’s yield on loans, which is determined by the market-clearing condition
mI
∗(rB;c)=¯ L−r + Lr. (15)




In a symmetric equilibrium, with n banks, oﬀering aggregate supply of
L = nLr,t h eﬁrst-order condition reduces to




where ηI/rB is the elasticity of the demand for loans with respect to rB,
deﬁned as ηI/rB ≡− dlnI∗(rB;c)/dln(rB).
Rearranging equation (17) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The (gross) expected yield on loans is equal to the (gross)
cost of funds, times a mark-up that depends negatively on the number of banks





where nηI/rB/(nηI/rB − 1) > 1.
3.4 Equilibrium Number of Banks
The equilibrium number of banks, n∗, is determined by the break-even con-
dition of the marginal bank. That is, for j = n∗ (given our ordering assump-
tion), expected net proﬁts are zero if and only if (rB − r0)Lr = μn∗.U s i n g
(18) yields
(rB − r0)Lr = μn∗ ⇔
1+r0
nηI/rB − 1
Lr = μn∗. (19)








In what follows we assume that ηI/rB > 1/n, to ensure an equilibrium
with positive interest rates and a positive number of banks. This condition
is actually not very restrictive. Using (17), equation (20) can be written
also as μn∗ = m(1 + rB)I∗/n2ηI/rB,w h e r edI∗/drB < 0 (see Proposition 1).











Hence, a higher borrowing rate will reduce the number of banks when
the demand for borrowing is elastic. It is easy to conﬁrm that in our model
ηI/rB → 2 when c → 0. The assumption of a relatively elastic demand for
funds is thus a reasonable benchmark, which allows us to evaluate the impact
of changes in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation.









which yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3. An increase in the banks’ cost of funds (resulting from
either an increase in the risk-free rate or a rise in the risk premium), or an
increase in monitoring costs, lower the equilibrium number of banks, n∗,a n d
increases the banks’ lending rate, rB.






[(rB − r0)Lr − μi]. (22)




∗(μn∗ − ¯ μ), (23)
where ¯ μ =
Pn∗
i=1 μi/n∗ is the average ﬁxed cost.
The equilibrium is characterized in Figure 1. The downward-slopping
curve is the demand for investment facing the representative bank as a func-
tion of banks’ expected yield, rB,w h e r er0 is the expected cost of funds. The
markup condition (18) determines the gap between the two, resulting with
each bank ﬁnancing Iau in the initial equilibrium, yielding expected gross
r e n tg i v e nb yt h ed o t t e dr e c t a n g l e(rB − r0)Iau. The equilibrium number of
banks is determined by the free entry condition, where the marginal bank
earns zero net rent: the expected gross rent, (rB − r0)Iau,e q u a l st h eﬁxed
cost of the marginal bank, μn∗.
3.5 Welfare
Our measure of welfare prior to joining the union, W, is the sum of the ex-
pected net income of domestic producers and domestic banks, as in Agénor
and Aizenman (1999), augmented by the consumers’ surplus. Speciﬁcally,
welfare prior to joining can be evaluated by the sum of the producers’ ex-
pected surplus, obtained by aggregating Π∗
E in (11) across all producers, the






B + SH. (24)
To account for an adverse impact of income volatility, consumers’ surplus
could for instance be deﬁned as
SH = E(Q) − 0.5θV(Q), (25)
16where Q is income, E the expectations operator, V the variance operator,
and θ>0. For simplicity, however, we will assume that income is exoge-
nous.8 Thus, changes in aggregate welfare will depend only on changes in
the producers’ and the banks’ expected surplus.
We turn now to an evaluation of the welfare impact of changes in the
cost of monitoring, c.R e c a l lt h a t ,ex ante, borrowers pay the cost of mon-
itoring in the form of higher expected real cost of borrowing (see equation
(7)). A higher c implies therefore a direct reduction in investment and a
lower producers’ surplus, thereby reducing the equilibrium number of banks
(see (11) and (21)). In addition, because the exit of marginal banks raises
the banks’ equilibrium lending rate, rB, the higher cost of borrowing trig-
gers a secondary round of adverse eﬀects, by further reducing equilibrium
















Hence, if ﬁnancial intermediation costs fall upon joining a union, welfare
would improve. However, as discussed next, the outcome is a lot more com-
plex if domestic banks have a comparative advantage in providing ﬁnancial
intermediation services to domestic entrepreneurs at lower monitoring costs
than foreign banks.
8The analysis could easily be extended to account for endogenous (labor) income, by
introducing labor in the production function (11) and assuming ﬁxed wages (see, for
instance, Agéor and Aizenman (1998, 1999). However, this would complicate the analysis
without adding much insight.
9The marginal impact of banks’ exit on Π∗
B is of a second-order magnitude, reﬂecting
the break-even condition of the marginal bank; hence its surplus is zero.
174 Gains from Joining a Union
Consider two countries (home or domestic, denoted H, and foreign, denoted
F) operating initially with each other a ﬂoating exchange rate or a ﬁxed
exchange rate subject to occasional realignments. They then choose to form
a currency union, which involves adopting the same currency and allowing
full ﬁnancial integration. In what follows, we discuss three channels through
which this decision will aﬀect each country individually: a transactions costs
eﬀect; a diversiﬁcation-risk premium eﬀect; and a bank competition eﬀect.
In each case, we examine the impact on welfare, as deﬁn e di n( 2 4 )w i t h
∆SH =0 . In order to simplify notations and avoid working systematically
with a two-country framework, we focus on the case where the countries
considered are identical in all respects, except possibly for the monitoring
costs associated with ﬁnancial intermediation.
4.1 Reduction in Transactions Costs
The adoption of a single currency implies that transactions costs associated
with conversion of foreign exchange, currency hedging, and the use of multiple
currencies for trading purposes, are either reduced or disappear entirely for
both countries. As noted by some observers, the reduction of these costs
c a nb ev i e w e da sap r o x yf o rt h ed e a d w e i g h ta n de ﬃciency losses in the
foreign exchange market that are eliminated through the adoption of a single
currency.10
A reduction in transactions costs can be formally captured in the model
by assuming, that upon joining the currency union, τ falls.11 From (21), the
10As noted by Grubel (2005, p. 512), joining a union also saves resources required to
run institutions whose purpose is to evaluate exchange rate risk and operate forward and
futures markets. This resource gain is not directly accounted for here.
11Assuming instead that τ drops to zero would lead to the same result as described next.
18equilibrium number of banks goes up; there is therefore an indirect compe-
tition eﬀect. From equation (18), and under the assumption ηI/rB > 1/n (as












implying that the cost of credit falls. This, in turn, stimulates private in-
vestment and increases the producers’ expected surplus. Thus, a reduction
in transactions costs improves welfare unambiguously.
4.2 Diversiﬁcation-Risk Premium Eﬀect
Suppose that, prior to forming the union, capital ﬂows between the two
countries are restricted to some degree by capital controls. Once the union
is formed, all restrictions on capital movements are lifted. Thus, another
channel through which the domestic country can beneﬁtf r o mf o r m i n ga
currency union is through a diversiﬁcation or risk premium eﬀect, which
results from the fact that domestic banks (and consumers) are now able to
diversify internationally their asset portfolios. In turn, the scope for greater
diversiﬁcation translates into a lower external risk premium.
Alternatively, suppose that the risk premium on domestic bonds depends
positively on the volatility of inﬂation–possibly because all assets and liabil-
ities are ﬁxed in nominal terms. If the volatility of inﬂation drops following
the formation of a successful currency union (because the risk associated
with an unexpected devaluation disappears, for instance), the risk premium
demanded by debt holders would fall. As in the case of the transactions
cost eﬀect described earlier, this would reduce the cost of credit, increasing
thereby optimal investment, as well as the equilibrium number of banks. The
19net welfare eﬀect is again be unambiguously positive.12
To characterize the ﬁrst eﬀect, suppose that countries have the same de-
gree of volatility of idiosyncratic shocks; that is, δi has the same distribution
across countries. In general, the distribution of δi could aﬀect ρ.H o w -
ever, given that the δi’s are diversiﬁable domestically, its eﬀect on ρ does
not change as a result of joining a union; the issue is the relation between
the two distributions of the macro shock in the two countries, εH
m and εF
m.
Suppose then that the correlation of the business cycle between the two coun-
tries is zero, that is, cov(εH
m,ε F
m)=0 .13 If the distribution of each shock is
characterized by (2), full diversiﬁcation of banks’ portfolios between the two
countries has the eﬀect of reducing lenders’ exposure to recession, reducing
thereby the risk premium needed to compensate depositors (see Agénor and
Aizenman (2006)). In turn, the reduction in the risk premium lowers the cost
of funds and increases producers’ proﬁts and banks’ surplus. There is also
an indirect competition eﬀect, to the extent that the lower premium leads to
an increase in the number of domestic banks. Although in (24) we do not
account explicitly for the welfare of depositors, the net overall eﬀect is thus
an increase in domestic welfare.
12Note that here we have focused only on the direct eﬀect of the currency union, which
is to reduce transaction costs within union members. There may also be an indirect eﬀect
(or stability gain), which may result from a reduction in the risk premium between the
union as a whole and the rest of the world.
13This assumption may not be warranted if increased trade among union members leads
to greater syncrhonization of business cycles. However, as noted earlier, some studies do
ﬁnd that increased trade leads to less, rather than more, syncrhonization (Barro and
Tenreyro (2007)). Assuming that cov(εH
m,ε F
m)=0corresponds therefore to a neutral
position.
204.3 Enhanced Competition
Now suppose that, upon forming the union, restrictions on entry of banks
from the partner country into the domestic economy are lifted at the same
time. There are two potential eﬀects of increased bank competition associ-
ated with entry: a) a change in the (equilibrium) number of banks; and b)a
reduction in (marginal) administration costs.
A useful way to understand the competition eﬀect of a union is to consider
t h ec a s ew h e r et h eh o m ee c o n o m yH forms a currency union with a foreign
economy F that is in all respects identical—including monitoring and contract
enforcement costs–with the formation of the union entailing the removal of
all restrictions on the operation of foreign banks in each economy. In these
circumstances, the formation of the union entails also a transformation from
“relative” ﬁnancial autarky to an integrated ﬁnancial equilibrium.14 The
welfare consequences of ﬁnancial integration can then be inferred by applying
Brander and Krugman (1983)’s logic in their seminal paper on “reciprocal
dumping,” which studies the impact of trade integration of two symmetric
economies, each characterized by imperfect Cournot competition.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that banks’ monitoring costs, when operating in their
own countries, H and F,a r ecH and cF, respectively. To simplify notation,
we focus on the case where cH = cF = c. Domestic banks in each country
have a cost advantage in their market relative to foreign banks. However,
they are at a disadvantage when operating outside their own local market,
which translates into an increase in monitoring and enforcement costs by
the magnitude t. These costs may reﬂect the fact that, for instance, seiz-
ing a fraction α of the realized value of output–or, more generally, pledged
14We refer to “relative” autarky because country H could have maintained unrestricted
ﬁnancial ﬂows with a third country, prior to forming the union with country F.
21collateral–in case of default may require recourse to a legal system that dif-
fers from the home country’s. Hence, the cost of H (F) banks operating in
country F (H)i sc + t. This “cost gap” leads to home bias in the provision
of ﬁnancial intermediation services, and is akin to the home bias in the con-
sumption of goods due to transportation costs emphasized by Brander and
Krugman (1983).
Recalling (6), and using (9) and (10), the expected cost of credit facing
the entrepreneur prior to joining the union is rB + ψc,w h e r eψ>0.A
domestic bank would be able to compete in the foreign country only if it is
able to charge the same contractual interest rate as the foreign bank operat-
ing in their country, rL. This in turn implies that the representative bank’s
expected return on the ﬁr s tu n i tl e n ti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e tw i l lb erB − tψ.
The expected cost disadvantage of the foreign operator, tψ,i sa k i nt ot h e
transportation cost separating the two markets in Brander and Krugman’s
“reciprocal dumping” model. If this cost disadvantage exceeds the gap be-
tween the expected return and the expected marginal cost of a loan prior
to joining (tψ > rB − r0), the formation of the union would not alter the
degree of competition in the domestic market of either country. However, if
tψ > rB−r0, it would be in the self interest of local banks to supply credit to
the foreign market–the ﬁrst unit lent in the foreign market would increase
each local bank’s proﬁts by rB − r0 − tψ. This would lead to “reciprocal
dumping,” with the net eﬀect of increasing competition and reducing the
cost of credit. The union-wide equilibrium would be established once the






where the index U stands for the integrated equilibrium, and MRU
L∗ is the
22expected increase in revenue associated with a unit lent by the representative
local bank in the foreign country.
Banks’ market power implies that MRU
L∗ = rU
B +( drU
B/dL∗)L∗,w h e r eL∗
stands for the loans of the representative local bank in the foreign country
(note that for the ﬁrst unit lent L∗ =0 , hence MRU
L∗
¯ ¯
L∗=0 = rB). The
competition eﬀect implies a lower cost of funds, which translates therefore
into an increase in the equilibrium level of investment, I∗.
Applying the logic of Brander and Krugman (1983), we can establish the
following result:
Proposition 4. Following the formation of a currency union between
two identical countries, the change in national welfare is positive if the cost
of home bias is small, and ambiguous if the cost disadvantage is large.
This result follows from the observation that serving a local market by
a foreign bank entails wasteful “cross hauling,” where some domestic loans
are supplied by foreign banks that face a cost disadvantage of tψ relative
to the case where all domestic loans are supplied by local banks. If the
extra cost of providing ﬁnancial intermediation services to a foreign market,
tψ, is low, the competition-induced welfare gain triggered by the entry of
f o r e i g nb a n k sw o u l de x c e e dt h ew e l f a r ec o s to fu s i n gar e l a t i v e l yi n e ﬃcient
provider of loans–thereby increasing welfare. But the reverse may apply for
a high enough cost disadvantage: if the extra cost of providing intermediation
services to the foreign market were to exceed the extra revenue generated by
a reduction in banks’ cost of funds, banks’ proﬁts would decline, inducing
the exit of marginal banks–which in tur nw o u l dl e a dt oh i g h e rl e n d i n gr a t e s
and lower investment.
The welfare eﬀect of enhanced competition is illustrated also in Figure
1. Assuming that the cost disadvantage is not prohibitive, the increase in
23competition induced by the union reduces home banks’ equilibrium expected
yield to rU
B. This in turn would increase funding for investment supplied by
the representative bank to IU, with a portion IH of it supplied to domestic in-
vestors and a portion IU−IH to foreign investors. Investors’ welfare improves,
as the expected cost of borrowed funds declines. The vertical trapezoid is
a welfare gain, associated with “investment creation.” More speciﬁcally, the
welfare gain associated with investment creation is the shaded trapezoid, the
base of which is the added investment, ∆I = IU −Iau, with its left and right
sides given by rB − (r0 + tψ) and rU
B − (r0 + tψ), respectively.
At the same time, however, the diversion of banks’ lending from the
domestic to the foreign source results in a welfare cost given by (Iau−IH)tψ,
the small rectangle. This cost reﬂects the ineﬃciency of replacing domestic
loans, associated with monitoring costs of c, with foreign loans, associated
with monitoring costs of c + t. Thus, in the same spirit as Brander and
Krugman (1983), the net welfare eﬀect of the union is ambiguous. If the cost
disadvantage of banks operating in foreign markets, t, is small enough, the
formation of the union will increase welfare of both members. This the case
illustrated in Figure 1. If the cost disadvantage if large enough, as would
b et h ec a s ei ftψ approaches rB − r0, the “lending diversion” eﬀect would
dominate the “investment creation” eﬀect, thereby reducing welfare. This is
t h ec a s ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 . 15
Greater competition tends to reduce bank’s expected gross rent due to two
eﬀects: a) the entry of foreign banks induces a drop in home banks’ margin,
inducing them to supply funds beyond the level where, prior to joining the
union, the marginal cost of funds equaled marginal revenue; and b)m a r k e t
15Note that even in this case, if the cost disadvantage shrinks and disappears over time
due to learning by doing, the formation of a currency union may still prove beneﬁcial down
the road. See the discussion in the concluding section.
24forces induce the bank to absorb its monitoring cost disadvantage in the
foreign market, (Iau − IH)tψ. Note, however, that the drop in the banks’
cost of funds would work in the opposite direction. If the competition eﬀect
dominates, expected gross rents would decline, inducing the exit of marginal
banks. This in turn would increase the demand facing infra-marginal banks.
A higher cost disadvantage in foreign markets, and a lower drop in home
banks’ cost of funds, both increase the likelihood of this outcome.
Our model can readily be extended to allow for asymmetric features,
including cost advantages for some banks (that is, the possibility of lower
monitoring costs, c). To illustrate, suppose that the only diﬀerence between
the two economies is that cH >c F, which implies that home banks are less
eﬃcient in providing ﬁnancial intermediation services than foreign banks. As
before, we assume that oﬀshore operations increase monitoring costs by t.T o
simplify the analysis, suppose that in prior to forming the union, the banks’
expected gross yield in both economies is the same, 1+rB. Similar to our
discussion before Proposition 4, a foreign bank that considers operating in
t h eh o m ee c o n o m yH will ﬁnd that its expected return on the ﬁrst unit lent
t oi nt h eh o m em a r k e ti srB− [t − (cH − cF)]ψ. Similarly, a home bank
attempting to operate in the foreign country F will ﬁnd that its expected
return on the ﬁr s tu n i tl e n tt oi nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ti srB− [t+(cH −cF)]ψ.
Hence, the superior monitoring technology by country F banks relative to
country H banks reduces the “cost gap” of foreign banks operating in the
home country to t − (cH − cF), while at the same time increasing the “cost
gap” of country H banks operating abroad to t +( cH − cF),r e l a t i v et ot h e
case of equal monitoring costs. If
[t +( c
H − c
F)]ψ>r B − r0 > [t − (c
H − c
F)]ψ,
the cost disadvantage of home banks relative to foreign banks will be large
25enough to prevent them from operating in country F, whereas the cost ad-
vantage of country F banks relative to home banks will induce country F
banks to provide oﬀshore banking services in country H. T h i si st h ec a s e
where asymmetry in monitoring costs translates into “asymmetric dumping,”
where only country F banks operate in both markets.
We also need to consider now the relationship between t and cH − cF.I f
t>c H − cF, the superior monitoring capacity of country F banks mitigates
the cost gap associated with oﬀshore operation by foreign banks in the home
country. A modiﬁed version of Figure 1 can then be applied to describe the
impact of country F banks on welfare in country H: investors in the home
country are better oﬀ due to the lower cost of funds induced by the entry
of country F banks; country H banks are worse oﬀ, because their volume
of intermediation drops to IH, without the gains of oﬀshore operations in
country F; and country F banks are better oﬀ by the extra rents associated
with their oﬀshore banking activities in country H, IU − IH.B yc o n t r a s t ,i f
t<c H − cF,c o u n t r yF banks have an absolute cost advantage over coun-
try H banks–even after accounting for the oﬀshore costs of operation. If
mergers are allowed, in these circumstances one would expect, following the
formation of the union, to observe mergers initiated by the more eﬃcient
banks, looking to “take over” the customer base of the less eﬃcient ones.
While the cost saving is an obvious welfare gain, such a process may ulti-
mately reduce competition if it leads to a large drop in the number of banks,
with a relatively small number of “mega-banks” ultimately dominating the
market.
265C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper examined the role of capital market imperfections in assessing
the welfare eﬀects of forming a currency union–a topic that has received
surprisingly little attention among researchers. Following a brief review of
the literature, we presented an analytical framework that we believe is a
useful starting point for addressing some of the core issues involved. Our
model considers a bank-only world where monitoring and state veriﬁcation
are costly and banks compete in Cournot fashion. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r
determined the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks,
prior to joining the union.
The second part identiﬁed various channels through which ﬁnancial fac-
tors may aﬀect the welfare gains that each country may derive from joining a
currency union, characterized by the elimination of foreign exchange risk, the
complete liberalization of capital movements, and the removal of restrictions
on the operation of foreign banks in each economy. Thus, upon forming the
union, foreign banks have access to the domestic capital market and may lend
to domestic ﬁrms. These channels include changes in transactions costs, a
diversiﬁcation-risk premium eﬀect, and enhanced bank competition. Regard-
ing the latter, we drew an important parallel between the added monitoring
costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country and
trade-related transportation costs, and derived a “reciprocal lending” equi-
librium akin to the “reciprocal dumping” equilibrium derived by Brander and
Krugman (1983) in their seminal model of trade under a Cournot duopoly.
In particular, our analysis showed that joining a currency union brings a
welfare gain to a country only if the cost disadvantage that banks face when
operating outside their own local market is suﬃciently small.
27The thrust of our analysis therefore is that, in the presence of credit
market imperfections, there are a number of eﬀects, operating through the
ﬁnancial system, that are associated with joining a currency union; the net
impact of these diﬀerent eﬀects on aggregate welfare of each individual coun-
try is in general ambiguous. Whether the competition eﬀect, in particular,
generates a welfare gain depends on how strong the “investment creation”
eﬀect is relative to the “intermediation diversion” eﬀect. By implication,
incentives to participate in a currency union will diﬀer across countries, de-
pending on their degree of ﬁnancial development. The beneﬁts, from the
perspective of a single country, of forming a currency union with another are
not necessarily symmetric across countries. Those with more eﬃcient ﬁnan-
cial systems have more to gain–as long as the costs that their banks must
incur to access foreign markets are not excessive.
At a more practical level, our model suggests also that the deeper ﬁnan-
cial integration of European countries and the formation of the Euro area set
in motion powerful competition eﬀects due to reciprocal lending by banks
that used to operate domestically, shielded from foreign competition. The
competition eﬀect is stronger the lower is the cost disadvantage of banks op-
erating in foreign markets, and the weaker was competition in the domestic
market prior to the union. For a low enough cost disadvantage of foreign
banks, the formation of the union would be welfare improving. The com-
petition eﬀe c tt e n d st oi n d u c et h ee x i to fm a r g i n a lb a n k s .I tm a ya l s ol e a d
to banking consolidation, in an attempt to exploit scale economies and to
reduce the exposure to risk by means of geographical diversiﬁcation. These
results are in line with the empirical evaluation of Méon and Weill (2005)
who, using data for all EU countries for the period 1960-95, found the exis-
tence of potential gains from inter-country pair mergers that would provide
28a better hedge against macroeconomic risk.16
Our analysis can be extended in a number of directions. First, in the
model, banks lend only to ﬁrms; a currency union brings therefore no direct
welfare gain to consumers, whose income was taken to be exogenous. This is
obviously not the case in practice; the formation of a union could bring direct
beneﬁts to consumers as well, most importantly in the form of enhanced
opportunities for portfolio diversiﬁcation and changes in the rate of return
on saving.
Second, the formation of a currency union may lead to important dynamic
eﬀects on the ﬁnancial system, such as a reduction of intermediation costs
over time, and changes in the distribution of credit, to the extent that ﬁrms
themselves relocate within the union. In particular, greater foreign bank
penetration may lead to improvement in monitoring eﬃciency of domestic
banks, which may translate into lower enforcement and veriﬁcation costs. In
turn, greater heterogeneity in these costs may aﬀect the present-value ben-
eﬁts from joining the union in the ﬁrst place. Alternatively, in a dynamic
setting, greater ﬁnancial integration between union members may lead to an
increase in the symmetry of business cycles. In turn, greater synchroniza-
tion of business cycles would reduce macroeconomic volatility, which would
encourage savings and investment.17 However, it is also possible, as argued
by Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003), that precisely because better ﬁnan-
cial integration enhances risk-sharing opportunities (or income insurance),
it may make specialization in production more attractive, thereby rendering
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations less, rather than more, symmetric.
16See Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) for an analysis of cross-border bank mergers
and acquisitions in Europe during the period 1996-2004.
17Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2002), using corporate-level data from ten countries that
adopted the euro, found that the introduction of the common currency lowered the cost
of capital for ﬁrms inside the union relative to that of ﬁrms outside it.
29Third, ﬁscal and monetary policy considerations could be added to the
analysis. If joining a union leads to an enhanced commitment to low inﬂation,
there may be a credibility gain that translates into a further reduction in the
risk premium that member countries face on international capital markets.18
However, this gain may be diluted if incentives for ﬁscal policy coordination
are perceived to be weakened by the loss of monetary autonomy. Indeed, if
the risk of default on government debt increases as a result, the drop in the
risk premium associated with a reduction in transactions costs may be more
than oﬀset, making the welfare gains of joining a union ambiguous.
Finally, while our analysis focused essentially on the various channels
through which forming a union may aﬀect domestic welfare, and the role of
intermediation costs in that context, it could be useful to analyze the impli-
c a t i o n so ft h e s ec o s t sf o rt h ef o r m u l a t i o no fau n i o n - w i d ew e l f a r ef u n c t i o n .A
similar issue was examined elsewhere in the literature on currency unions (see
Benigno (2004) and Lombardo (2006)). Benigno (2004), for instance, using a
two-country model where labor is immobile and money is not neutral due to
price rigidities, found that the union-wide welfare function (which is based on
deadweight losses) should provide higher weight to the inﬂation rate in the
country with a higher degree of nominal rigidity. In the present context, the
question that could be addressed is whether the union-wide welfare function
should provide higher weight to expected loss in the country with a higher
degree of capital market imperfections.
18Grubel (2005) for instance argued that in a curreny union, countries may enjoy better
monetary policy. This arises partly because the large institutions to which they surrender
their monetary sovereignty are more likely to be free from political inﬂuences, and partly
b e c a u s et h e yh a v em o r eﬁnancial and human resources to design and implement policy
decisions.
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  Figure 2 
The Reciprocal Lending Equilibrium: Lower Welfare 
 
 
 